THE REFERENCE OF “GOD” REVISITED
Hugh Burling

I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description
“the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival
theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain
the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed
down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier
of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthiness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some
putative counterexamples to the view.

Introduction
What should our semantic theory for the term “God” be? How is it that
when we use the term “God” referentially, it really picks out God? Alternatively, what is picked out by “God”? Any answer to either of these
questions will help answer the other. The answer I defend below is that
the reference of “God” is determined via the implicit sense of the term,
the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I think
that this view leads inexorably in the direction of perfect being theism, but
showing this goes beyond the scope of the argument here. To understand
what is at stake in these two questions about how “God” refers and who
“God” refers to, I begin by describing two focal desiderata for a semantics
for “God”: what I call “accessibility” and “scope.” Both accessibility and
scope catch various reasons given in favour of one theory against another
and can be satisfied to greater and lesser degrees by different theories. Accessibility concerns how easy it is for individual “God”-users to meet the
conditions on successful reference imposed by the theory. Scope concerns
how much disagreement about the nature of “God”’s referent can be tolerated and how far our theory “draws together” parties to disagreements
in co-reference rather than letting them “split apart” easily.
I examine three competing theories in contemporary philosophy of
religion to see how they fare in meeting our desiderata. The first, which I
will call the “Causal Reference” view (CR), has explicit defenders in both
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William Alston1 and Meghan Sullivan.2 In short, CR tells us that “God” is
a proper name bestowed by Abraham on the object of his religious experiences3 and taught to his astronomically numerous descendants through
a chain of testifiers. The second, which I will call the “Descriptive Denotation” view (DD), is defended in hybrid form by Richard Gale,4 but is a
good umbrella for “traditional” views given theologians’ habit of defining
“God” in terms of a list of attributes that set Him apart from creatures.
DD tells us that “God” picks out an object which uniquely satisfies a
definite description, perhaps consisting in a precise list of predicates, or
perhaps a cluster of them. The third view is candidate for a specific “traditional” view which I will call the “Worship-Worthiness” view (WW).
The Worship-Worthiness view gives God’s worthiness of worship a more
fundamental role than merely being an example of one of the properties
DD requires, telling us instead that “God” refers simply to “the being that
is worthy of our worship.”
For each view, I will articulate it and assess how far it satisfies the two
desiderata. Ultimately, I conclude that the Worship-Worthiness view fares
the best: it makes God more easily semantically accessible and supports
the widest scope for co-reference between those who use the term “God.”
It’s worth emphasizing, however, that this is a comparative argument: CR
and DD are not “defeated,” with WW the “survivor.” Accessibility and
Scope are not “fail-or-pass” necessary conditions for a successful theory
of the reference of “God,” but rather desiderata which a theory can meet
more or less successfully. Worship-Worthiness, I argue, meets them with
more success than its rival, CR, and its less precise parent, DD.
Before proceeding, a significant qualification needs to be made to everything that follows. I tie up the accuracy of a semantic theory for “God”
with how far it meets the Accessibility and Scope desiderata. Both desiderata crucially involve successful reference, albeit in different ways, by
“God” to—something; what this something must be, is part of what the
rival theories disagree about. But successful reference usually requires
that the referent actually exist. This means that the accuracy of each theory
is in turn going to depend to some extent on some extremely controversial
matters of fact about metaphysics: for example, whether Abraham’s or
some other prophets’ religious experiences really had independent objects
as causes, or whether there is a being satisfying whatever list DD stipulates, or whether there is in fact a being worthy of worship.5 Given the
significance of the disagreements between the rival theories about what
Alston, “Referring to God.”

1

Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy.”

2

This is an iteration of CR for “God” as used in the mouths of Abrahamic monotheists
speaking English. Zoroastrians, for example, might translate “Ohrmazd” as “God” and
thereby inherit “God” from Zarathustra’s initial ostension.
3

Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God.
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My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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“God” might turn out to refer or fail to refer to, and not just about how
successful reference comes about, it won’t be enough to simply stipulate
that we are evaluating the rivals having taken something called “theism”
for granted. The theories have implications for what the “proper” content
of “theism” is. Instead, we can drive a wedge between those matters of
metaphysical fact (whether a deity spoke to Abraham, whether there is
an eternal creator or perfect being, and so on) and the relative success of
the theories by considering how semantically accessible each makes their
referent for “God,” and the Scope for co-reference they produce between
users of “God,” another way. We should evaluate each theory in conditional terms: if the referent of God the theory suggests “God” refers to did
exist, how semantically accessible would that being be for “God”-users?
And how much co-reference between doxastically divergent “God”-users
would there be? This way the ability to meet either of the desiderata is
unhitched from those metaphysical controversies which lie outside the linguistic, phenomenological, and axiological considerations directly in play.
Accessibility
We find out what a word means by looking at how it works. Trivially,
we do things with words by using them within what I’ll call “linguistic
practices.” In natural languages, the rules governing these practices
are implicit and often fuzzy or very complicated. Moreover, in natural
languages, some terms and expressions can operate very differently in
different contexts, so that it is helpful to think of those terms as being employed in a wider web of interlocking linguistic practices. For example: we
are not primarily interested here in what we refer to, if anything, when we
shout the term “God” when we get hurt; that is, while using the profanity
practice;6 but instead we are interested in what the term refers to when
we use it to discuss what God is like, to talk to Him, and to accomplish
other goals and moves in the theistic religious linguistic practice. Note
well that we use this practice not only to find out or teach others about
God but, also, to attempt to draw ourselves closer to Him and carry out
any duties we have toward Him which require language use. Given that
peoples’ typical use of language is a universally available source of data
about how words “work,” and that other sources such as metaphysical
or axiological commitments are likely to be more controversial, I suggest
that we analyze linguistic practices by adopting a charitable hermeneutic.
This means taking practitioners’ expressions at face value except in cases
where we have strong reasons to suppose some literary or rhetorical trope
is at work. It likewise means taking intended or purported reference to be
evidence, if defeasible, of actual reference. Given that natural languages
both develop over time and between places, but are rule-governed enough
6
Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy”) argues that blasphemy is uniquely wrong precisely because blasphemous uses confuse us about the rules of the theistic religious linguistic
practice. She is not interested in blasphemy in this sense, however but in the sense of libelling
God (160).
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to merit analysis, I would finally suggest that whether or not a “rule” obtains within a practice does not depend on whether the words involved
in the practice are always used in exactly the way that rule implies. Nor,
I suggest, does a rule’s obtaining depend on unanimous agreement with
that rule, among practitioners, were it described back to them. Indeed, if
it did, the existence of philosophical disagreement about the semantics for
“God” would mean that there could be no such semantics.
One easily discernible feature of the theistic religious practice is that
most humans seem capable of playing it successfully. It doesn’t seem to require “special training.” Although we might use it better if we have certain
kinds of training, children seem to be able to speak as intelligibly about
and to God as they can about and to creatures. So, we can infer that God
is highly linguistically accessible via the term “God.” What this evidence
suggests is that, in general, successful reference to or denotation of God by
“God” is easy to achieve. So, I contend that our linguistic habits indicate
that the object, God, is highly, or very easily, accessible by the term “God.”
For brevity I will also write as if accessibility pertains to the term, “God,”
by which I only mean that it is easy for us to access God by using it. We are
judging accounts as to whether they render “God” more or less accessible,
and they do better where they make it more so.
A denier of the claim that “God” is very accessible might reject the above
inference from the ability of children and the theologically untrained to
properly use “God.” They might block the inference by claiming that ignorant or apparently untrained speakers have typically been raised in a
religious tradition or in a culture with a theological hinterland; and this
“catechesis,” or intellectual hinterland, will constitute a form of “special
training.”
But consider those we have in mind under the class of “apparently untrained speakers”: not only small children in active religious communities
but, also, those in post-religious societies. While a non-religious adult in
such a society might have come across art and literature with religious
themes, their children will not have intellectual access to the cultural hinterland which our objector appeals to as a form of special training. And the
level of conceptual content in the “catechesis” enjoyed by a very young,
but apparently competent “God”-user, will be very thin indeed. So, either
the sense of “special training” is so thin that it is compatible with a very
great deal of accessibility, and we arrive at the conclusion that “God” is
highly accessible; or, the original inference goes through.
One specific demand this ease of access makes, evident from the above
cases of ignorant or juvenile speakers, is that one can successfully refer to
God by using “God,” without needing a sophisticated conceptual apparatus related to one’s use or understanding of the term. According to this
demand, a semantic theory for “God” will do better insofar as the conceptual resources demanded of its users are low enough to match many typical
cases, such as the child at prayer or the questions of the spiritual seeker
in a post-religious society. If such people are to use “God” successfully,
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then such usage cannot require much by way of beliefs about God or understanding of the senses of predicates involved in such beliefs.
I don’t intend to settle the question of just precisely how linguistically
accessible the theistic linguistic practice makes God—nor do I appeal to a
precise value in my arguments below. Since below we are comparing three
theories for accessibility, I hope that our familiarity with religious practices
will indicate to us that the Causal Reference and Descriptive Denotation
views do not account for sufficient accessibility and that Worship-Worthiness does not make God “too” accessible. Dialectically, however, the
accessibility criterion is on safe ground, since Alston, Sullivan, and Gale
use concerns about conceptual demands7 and fragile causal chains8 to motivate their preferred views.
Scope
Users of the theistic religious linguistic practice should be able to corefer to God when they use the same term as each other—even when
they strongly disagree about what the thing each calls “God” is like. Our
different theories provide for co-reference in different ways; and those differences mean that each theory implies a different scope for co-reference.
While I find it intuitive that our theory of how “God” refers will be preferable the wider the scope for co-reference it establishes, a correct theory
must draw the line somewhere. We only need to find one case where it
is uncontroversial that two speakers uttering “God” in their language do
not co-refer to show that such a line exists. Yet there are two aspects of the
theistic religious linguistic practice which I think indicate that the right
theory will extend co-reference very widely.
The first is the explicit language used in much religious and theological
controversy. When Christians, Jews, Muslims and (many) Hindus disagree,
they appear to disagree about the nature of the same object. Christians insist that God was incarnate in Christ, but Jews insist that God has not been
(and perhaps never will be) incarnate; Muslims claim that God is only one
“person,” some Christians that He is three, and some Hindus that It is
none. These are the sorts of claims which cut to the heart of theology. Disagreements typically take the form of “I believe that a is F, but you believe
a is G” or “We should φ a, not ψ a.” There is no inevitability to this, and it
is what we would expect if co-reference is occurring. If co-reference were
not the norm, we would expect a lot more disagreement to be couched
differently. We would expect disagreements to typically take the form of
“I believe there’s an x which is F, a, but no x which is G, but you believe
there’s an x which is G, b,” or “We should φ a rather than ψ b.” We can regard the assumption of co-reference as an explanation for why theological
and religious disagreement tends to take the first two forms, rather than
the latter two. If co-reference were not in place, then disagreements of the
See Alston, “Referring to God,” 116 and Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 161–163.
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Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 301.
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first two forms would not typically be genuine disagreements, but rather,
the reference for “God” in the parties’ mouths would be “split”; and those
parties would routinely labour under a misunderstanding, talking past
each other.9 Perhaps there is an alternative explanation which is consistent
with widespread “split reference” between “God”-users, but it seems to
me that our motivation to look for such an explanation will be provided
by evidence in favour of a view with low scope. A charitable, face-value
reading of the language typical in religious and theological controversy
puts the presumption in favour of high scope.10
The second arises from the translatability of “God” across languages.11
Missionaries seem able to make theistic claims understood across very
different cultures, often without shared linguistic histories. It is natural to
suppose that such translation was easy due to shared reference by the two
poles of the translation. If “God” (and its translations) refer to One Thing,
and our minds are equipped to distinguish between that One Thing and
other things, translation will be easy. If this explanation is right, the history
of proselytism will provide evidence of very widespread co-reference.
Terms are sometimes (apparently) translated without co-reference. For
example, a referent can be dubbed with a term in one language, and its
features over time create a sense for that term; then a different referent,
known to the speakers of a second language, can share enough of those
features that the term is translated into whatever term in the second language refers to the other referent. Over time, commerce between speakers
of the two languages can come to clarify resulting confusions. Cases like
this abound in the taxonomy of wildlife. Should we think that the translation of “God” is such a case? On the one hand, even if (for example)
El-Shaddai and Chukwu were in fact two distinct individuals, despite
Christian missionaries to Nigeria translating both as “God,” it would be
much harder for us to establish that they are two distinct individuals than
it is for biologists to establish the distinct speciation of two geographically
separated populations in the same genus so that the “confusion” could be
“cleared up.” On the other, when we reflect on the translation process, and
the “clarification” process, we immediately begin to imagine instances of
the theological controversies discussed above. Missionaries working in
the cases we are considering tried to persuade the Igbo people that they
9
Versions of this argument for co-reference between Christians and Muslims have been
offered by Dale Tuggy in his “The ‘Same God’ Controversy and Christian Commitment—
Part 1,” and by Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 163).
10
See Bogardus and Urban’s “How to Tell Whether Christians and Muslims Worship
the Same God” (179–181) for an explanation of why these habits of disagreement do not
guarantee co-reference between “God”-users in different traditions: it is possible that these
practices obtain and yet co-reference is broken by reference shift. My argument here is that
co-reference is a charitable “null hypothesis” which explains these features of theological
disagreement and which we need good reasons to reject.
11
An early version of the argument that the translatability of “God” between languages
indicates co-reference between religious traditions can be found in Geach, God and the Soul
(108–109).
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were mistaken about details concerning Chukwu’s activities and nature,
not Its existence as opposed to El-Shaddai’s—if they had taken the latter
strategy, “Chukwu” would not now translate “God” in Igbo translations
of the Bible. I take it to be the null hypothesis, or at least more charitable,
to suppose that missionaries and converts at the time could discern the
common reference of different terms, rather than that they were “misled”
by similarities between two different (postulated) beings.12
Alternatively, there is the possibility that instead of co-reference across
languages, there has occurred reference change over generations of contact between dominant monotheistic, and dominated heno-, panen-, or
polytheistic cultures. In the Chukwu case, then: the term comes to refer to
the same thing as “God” as converts outnumber traditionalists among the
Igbo people. Again, however, I think that an interpretation of the history
of “God” which is charitable to its users shows this possibility to be just
that; the actual use of the word indicates co-reference.
Assuming co-reference between the missionary and convert, such linguistic-historical evidence also tells in favour of both kinds of accessibility,
since any necessary concepts must be coarse-grained enough to be available from within unconnected intellectual histories.
Finally, inclusivist accounts of theological knowledge, or pluralistic
philosophies of religion, according to which all or most “religions” are
“really about” the “same thing,” such as John Hick’s,13 depend on a very
extensive co-reference for “God” between speakers with very different
arrays of theological beliefs and concepts. This means that theories of the
reference of “God” which support wider co-reference will benefit from the
support of arguments for pluralism or inclusivism, be these arguments
moral, prudential, phenomenological, or epistemic.14
The above two arguments together make a generous scope for coreference a desideratum of theories of how “God” refers.

12
This is the interpretation of the interaction between the Ibo and Christian missionaries
described by Edmund Egbo in his “A Reassessment of the Concept of Ibo Traditional Religion”
(75–79). I emphasise that this interpretation is charitable with respect to the motivations of
missionaries, their local collaborators, and conversions being intellectual or theological—as
one anonymous reviewer has pointed out, developments in translations between religious
linguistic practices can be driven by pragmatic considerations as well as the desire to “get
it right.” If we assume, however, that these translation practices are routinely “infected” by
considerations that would lead their development to tend away from a coherent semantics
or successful reference, then we should expect there to be no successful semantic theory for
a term with as broad a history as “God”—only a series of case-by-case explanations of use.
13
An influential example of a pluralism which guarantees that all religions are about the
same thing is John Hick’s. Unfortunately, Hick’s account risks rendering all religions being
about something which might lead many “God”-users to cease worshipping it: a Kantian
noumenon he calls “the Real” (An Interpretation of Religion, 241–249).
14
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that particular versions of pluralism
or inclusivism might include or generate claims of co-reference between different uses of
“God” which many readers would find highly contentious—Hick’s in particular. But this
need not deprive the scope criterion of the support it receives from any arguments for these
views, wherever the arguments do not themselves entail contentiously wide scope.
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Since the arguments for greater accessibility and wider scope involve
empirical generalizations about religious and theological practice, they do
not support precise delineations as to how much “split reference” a theory
can allow or produce, nor how semantically vulnerable it can make or
allow “God” to be, before it becomes unacceptable. Nor do they give clear
instructions for how to weigh these desiderata against each other and
against other considerations. In considering the three competing views
below, therefore, they will help us to organize our judgments and see
connections in the current debate, but will not straightforwardly deliver
deductive judgment of victory.
The Causal Reference View
The Causal Reference (CR) view applies the theory of the reference of
names and natural-kind-terms developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and
associated with Saul Kripke,15 to the divine case, taking “God” to be a
proper name. According to this “causal theory,” generally speaking, who
(or what) a name or natural-kind-term refers to depends on who was
“baptized” with it when the initial users of that name began to use it.
Those initial users then communicate it to subsequent users, who defer to
the initial users regarding its reference. The second generation can be deferred to by the third, and so on, until members of enormous communities
spread diachronically across time can use the term to successfully refer to
the initial individual, even if they could never have met that individual,
and even if they have few true beliefs about the individual. In the case of
“God,” Alston suggests that religious communities might have ways of
identifying a common Object of their “religious” experiences and “baptizing” it “God”; the handing down of their religious practices enables the
communication of the name to subsequent generations.16
CR initially scores well on accessibility because virtually no conceptual
apparatus is required on the part of “God”-users to successfully refer to
God using “God.” As Sullivan explains,
Speakers do not need a unique description of God, nor do they even need
an accurate description of God in order to use a divine name to refer to him.
Children and anyone else who finds themselves theologically impoverished
can refer merely by deferring to others who are in a position to refer.17

Unfortunately, Sullivan argues that the linguistic accessibility of God
is reduced by the potential changing of the reference of “God” over time.
According to causal theories of reference, irregularities in the causal chain
between baptism and late speaker can make it the case that the late speaker
fails to refer to the baptized object. Speakers within the community might
15

The locus classicus is Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.

Compare the versions of this account given by Alston (“Referring to God,” 118–119)
and Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 162, and “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness”).
16

17

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 43.
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use the already-taken name to baptize a new object, and so introduce a
“competing chain”:18 if later speakers defer to the re-users of the name,
they will refer to the new object rather than the old. Things can be more
complicated: Sullivan gives the case of King Arthur19 to illustrate how late
inheritors of a name could, on the causal view, refer indiscriminately to
any member of a collection of objects. Whilst there might have been an
original baptizand of “Arthur”—let’s say, a retired Roman general gone
native after too many feasts at Tintagel—a whole band of fictional or obscured heroes hailed in proto-Arthurian epics bear just as strong causal
relations to the name in our mouths.
Suppose that we, like Alston, take “God” to refer to the common religious-experiential object of the ancient Israelites.20 Sullivan argues that,
empirically, that puts “God” users in semantic hot water: “the contemporary Catholic Church is the product of two thousand years of theological
mergers and acquisitions . . . early Church history is full of events where
distinct cultures puzzled over how to combine their metaphysical theories with the growing church. . . . And Catholics are not alone in this;
nearly every major religion can find syncretistic events in their formative
years.”21 On CR, then, there is a substantial risk that modern-day users of
“God” lie at the ends of diverse, confluent, or interrupted causal chains
so that many do not successfully refer to God, and hence refer to different
beings or refer with varying degrees of success. Sullivan reckons that this
risk raises a “problem of semantic divine hiddenness” because many believers might not have linguistic access to God of the sort we would expect
personal relationships to require. So, CR puts both God’s semantic accessibility, and the co-reference of “God,” in jeopardy to intellectual history.
For this reason we should judge the theory to fare poorly with respect to
our two desiderata.
To shore up the theory, we can offer solutions to the “semantic hiddenness” Sullivan identifies. Her preferred response is to add a theological
epicycle to the Causal Reference view, where divine providence secures
the causal chain in the required way, through the Holy Spirit’s work in
the Church. She prefers this to a potential response coming from Alston’s
original defence of CR, which she regards as inadequate because it would
restrict the scope of the theory so much that co-reference between theists
of different Abrahamic traditions would be threatened.22 It’s worth considering Alston’s alternative, however, since it not only protects CR from
rendering “God” too semantically vulnerable, and thereby God too inaccessible, but also protects CR from a central objection of Gale’s.

18

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 44.

19

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 44–45.

20

As he does in Alston, “Referring to God,” 121.

21

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 46.

22

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48–49.
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Gale argues23 that it is impossible for subjects of theistic religious experiences to identify that they are seeing the same object as in their last
experience, and hence as in each other’s, because picking out and re-identifying individual phenomenal objects requires a zone of at least two
dimensions in the putative perceptual field. This would make it impossible to satisfy the requirement of CR that God be baptized by ostension
to begin causal chains of reference. Alston insists that “we should not
suppose that we can identify a priori any limits on what objective features
can manifest themselves in patterns of phenomenal qualia . . . we can learn
only from experience what features and activities of God can be recognizable by the way God presents Himself.”24 Nevertheless, defenders of the
possibility of identifying God in religious experiences need to have some
rules by which their subjects would tell the difference between an appearance of God and an appearance of something else, or no appearance at all.
Alston’s solution is to lean on the practices of the communities in which
the experiences occur. What he calls “mystical doxastic practices” are sets
of rules, habits, and attitudes which allow their practitioners to discern
when God is appearing to them.25 So Abraham and his heirs and successors can successfully pick out God and dub Him “God” by using their
mystical doxastic practice (however rudimentary theirs was). They can
pass on the name for reference by deference to their intention, as well as
teaching their successors how to re-locate God experientially so that “if
things go right, we also attain some firsthand experiential acquaintance
with God to provide still another start for chains of transmission.”26
But the doxastic practice set-up also provides for a solution to Sullivan’s
semantic problem of divine hiddenness which she calls “the quarantined
deference response.”27 A practice for discerning when God is appearing and
when He is not is epistemically respectable, and hence respectable for the
purposes of baptism by ostension and tradition of a name by testimony,
only if it is socially established. Socially established mystical doxastic
practices are much narrower, and more tightly controlled, than the whole
theistic religious linguistic practice. This narrowness can exclude causal
chains gone awry, so that practitioners can “avoid the problem of semantic
shift . . . by resolving to only defer very selectively when [they] use divine
names,”28 that is, only to successful mystics within their practice.
Unfortunately, Alston’s solution makes each community’s referent of
“God” semantically accessible to “God”-users only at the directly proportional cost of scope for co-reference across those communities. Whatever
the object of Ignatius of Loyola’s religious experiences, my fellow spiritual
23

Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 7, 327–341.

24

Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 47.

25

Alston, Perceiving God, 184–225.

26

Alston “Referring to God,” 119.

27

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48.

28

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 48.
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exercisers and I will have secure and easy access to it via “God” by selectively deferring only to St Ignatius’s usage of “God.” But if we are referring
to the same object as other Christians, we must be deferring to earlier and
more figures in our quarantine of “God”-users, and semantic hiddenness
will return. The situation becomes proportionately worse, God proportionately more “hidden,” as we take Jesuit “God”-users to refer to the same
object as Jews, Muslims, Zoroastrians, and so on. In other words, advocates
of CR must choose a trade-off between reduced scope and reduced accessibility if Gale’s objection demands a response like Alston’s.
Sullivan’s preferred solution to semantic divine hiddenness raises similar difficulties. She argues that the truth of sufficiently robust accounts
of providence would imply that the necessary causal chains have in fact
been preserved.29 St Irenaeus assures us that “the preaching of the Church
is on all sides consistent . . . and hath its testimony from the Prophets
and Apostles, because the Spirit uses the Church as ‘a precious vessel’ to
guard the ‘noble treasure’ of the faith.”30 Sullivan notes that this solution
ideologically inflates CR to involve divine-providential mechanics as well
as familiar causal mechanics.31 Other things being equal, then, if Sullivan
is right about CR’s generation of a problem which demands a theodicy, we
should prefer a theory which can remain leaner by not raising the problem
at all. A similar consideration will apply to a similar strategy suggested by
de Ridder and van Woudenberg:32 all humans respond (perhaps in religious experience) to the same God via His general revelation. Particularly,
human religions which involve the theistic religious linguistic system use
their term translating “God” to pick out the object so responded to. If so,
when speakers in different traditions call the object of their religious experiences “God,” since it is God indeed who is appearing to them, they
will co-refer. It will also “refresh” the causal chains and reduce semantic
vulnerability. The doctrine of general revelation may be true, but if an
alternative theory of the reference of “God” can do without it, so much the
better for that alternative.
One final comment about the scope limitations of CR. CR’s advocates
typically regard it as a reason to prefer CR that, thanks to the common
29

Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 49.

30

Irenaeus, Five Books of S. Irenaeus: Bishop of Lyons, Against Heresies, 302–303.

Sullivan points out that providence is less inflationary than the “reference magnetism”
which secular accounts of reference must appeal to in the face of gerrymandered, metaphysically possible beings which match terms’ rules of usage just as well as whatever is picked
out by baptizing or describing (Sullivan, “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 49).
Jumping the gun somewhat, the Worship-Worthiness view appeals to a definite description
which excludes gerrymandered rivals to God by allowing users to defer to moral facts to
which they might not have cognitive access. The rules of theological discourse are poorly,
that is profligately, explained if “God” means some complex definite description which picks
out a strange being but yet matches our use of “God,” and efficiently explained (I argue) if
“God” means “the being which is worthy of our worship.”
31

32
de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same
God,” 60.
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historical origins of the Abrahamic religion, it provides for co-reference
between “God”-users of all the Abrahamic faiths.33 The considerations
I gave to support the scope desideratum might, however, demand a
higher bar: apparently genuine theological disagreement occurs across
the boundary between the Abrahamic and other faiths—faiths without a
common historical origin.
The Descriptive Denotation View
The simplest version of the Descriptive Denotation view is that “God”
refers to Who it does by standing in for a description of someone, and
only God satisfies that description.34 DD seems a natural way to think
about how “God” refers due to the habit of theologians from Arius35 to
Zizioulas36 of “introducing” their readers to God by giving a list of adjectives intended to differentiate Him from everything else. Because the
lists of divine names we find in such sources are heterogeneous, presentations of DD need not commit to a specific list as being constitutive of
the theory—any more than accounts of CR need to commit to a specific
history of the transmission of the name “God.”
In terms of general theories of reference, DD could be taken to rely on
a Russellian or Millian view about how names “denote” in virtue of their
implicit description, along with the understanding that “God” is a name
in this sense. Understood in this way, however, DD will be vulnerable to
standard objections to this view of names. Instead, DD can be articulated
as foregoing the assumption that “God” is a proper name—or even a natural-kind-term—and supposing “God” stands in for a definite description
which picks out the set of things which satisfy (perhaps, which could
possibly satisfy) that description. If the descriptions involved were too
vague, then DD would immediately fare terribly on the scope criterion
because co-reference would be threatened by multiple membership of the
set of those picked out by “God.” Fortunately, however, the candidates
for such descriptions which we find in theological literature, liturgy, and
the mouths of believers asked to define “God,” typically render that set
either a singleton or empty. For example, “the creator of the universe” is
empty if theism is false, whether because the universe was not created
or because it was created by committee. When terms are used to mean
things in this way, we sometimes speak of “denoting” as distinct from
33
See Miller, “The Reference of ‘God,’” 14; Alston, “Referring to God,” 126–127; Sullivan
“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 162–163 and “The Semantic Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 39,
43, for agreement on this point.
34
More refined versions could appeal to “cluster concepts” where not all co-referents need
to have the same description in mind, but the descriptions must be part of a set. The refined
versions can ameliorate accessibility problems for DD only by expanding the set, reducing
the chance that the descriptions in the set in fact pick out one thing, and so increasing scope
problems.
35

As quoted in Athanasius, De Synodis 2:15, 2:16.

36

See, for example, Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics 40–44.
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“referring,” and “referring” is then restricted for the kind of “meaning”
that names, specifically, have of the things they name.37 Since either way
we are answering the question of what “thing” or “person” is “picked
out” by “God,” whether or not “God” operates like a name or a title, I shall
continue to write of the “reference” of “God,” even if according to this
distinction “God” only “denotes” by standing in for a definite description.
DD can be criticized for its threats to accessibility. For any definite
description of “God” which plausibly has a unique satisfier, many apparently competent “God”-users will not have that definition in mind. We
can address this by supposing, as Alston puts it, that any such user “has
in reserve”38 their denoting description, perhaps mnemonically, but more
normally by deference to others. In doing so, we risk re-introducing the
ball of tangled deference chains which threatened ordinary believers’ accessibility on CR. We can, of course, quarantine our deference to untangle
the ball somewhat—but again, it will come at the cost of co-reference with
“God”-users at the ends of chains outside our quarantine.
A feature of DD which I find more pressing, however, is that it comes
with no normative component as to what definite descriptions are good
candidates for definitions of “God.” Rather, it implicitly tells us to look at
how the theistic religious practice is carried out to devise one. And when
we do that, we discover a problem.
DD itself does not specify what definite description allows “God” to
denote God. So, just as CR delegates the “true story” about the causal history of the name “God” to intellectual history, DD also delegates the detail
of working out the correct definite description. But to what discipline? An
answer which has proven attractive to some theologians is “confessional
theology.” That is, the one who wants to know what “God” denotes might
derive a definite description of God from their beliefs about what God is
like, more than by considering how the word is used.
When this occurs, it is often part of a wider strategy to close a religious
controversy of the typical “I believe that a is F, but you believe a is G” or
“We should φ a, not ψ a” forms, and open up a new controversy of the less
tractable forms “I believe there’s an x which is F, a, but no x which is G, but
you believe there’s an x which is G, b,” and “We should φ a rather than ψ
b.” The beliefs cited in such manoeuvres are not even always core creedal
claims involving concepts widely shared by believers. Consider criticisms
of natural and liberal theology at the end of the Reformed tradition:
“The God who is “conceived” by thought is not the one who discloses
Himself; from this point of view He is an intellectual idol.”39 By taking
the rather odd properties of having-disclosed-Himself-in-the-Incarnation, or
37
This distinction is drawn in Donnellan’s argument (“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 281) against Russell’s view of the semantics for definite descriptions and, thereby,
names.
38

Alston, “Referring to God,” 113.

39

Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, 136.
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not-having-been-conceived-by-thought, to be part of a definition for “God,”
Emil Brunner does not have to show that Reformed Christianity is correct
about God and his opponents mistaken. Liberal Protestants and Catholics
are just talking about something else, something which is an “idol” as far
as Christians should be concerned. Or consider remarks made by Cardinal
Burke on Christian and Muslim dialogue in a recent interview: “I don’t
believe it’s true that we’re all worshipping the same God, because the God
of Islam is a governor.”40 This absolves him of engaging with the question
of who is correct about how God wants humans to live and allows him
to re-cast that question into a question about whose being really exists;
or—and I think this is telling—whose being is worth trusting for salvation,
or obeying, or worshipping.
If this manoeuvre occurred all the time, then it would undermine the
empirical claims about theological controversy made in defence of the
scope desideratum above. To this reader, however, such manoeuvres
stand out as notable exceptions to general practice, exceptions which
sometimes seem not to take the religious aspirations of interlocutors as
seriously as they deserve. Consider both cases above: Reformed, Catholic, and Lutheran Christians assumed they were disagreeing about the
same being for five-hundred years before twentieth-century Protestant
criticisms of natural theology.41 Christian and Muslim theologians and
religious leaders (if not, perhaps, the authors of popular fiction or political propaganda) have almost always regarded each other as disagreeing
about the nature of one God.
Since DD delegates the task of spelling out how “God” refers in this
way, it risks massively reducing scope for co-reference. The natural solution is to take on that task for ourselves, having reflected on the desiderata
of accessibility and scope, and seek to specify a more principled definite
description which meets them better. Worship-Worthiness is an attempt at
that task.42
40
Burke, Wheeler, and Fessio, “Final Transcript—Tele-press Conference with Cardinal
Raymond Leo Burke,” 17.
41
See Sudduth’s The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology for an overview of this agreement.
42
This way of jeopardizing scope also affects Causal Reference in a roundabout way
which is worth illustrating in response to de Ridder and van Woudenberg’s confessional
articulation of the Causal Reference view. Consider differing responses to a thought-experiment offered by Alston in his defence of CR:
[The Satan Case:]
Suppose that an impostor—the devil, one’s internalized father figure, or whatever—represents himself as God. We are to imagine someone who, like the Old
Testament prophets, takes himself to be addressed by God, to be given commissions by God, and so on. But, unlike the Old Testament prophets, as they have
traditionally been regarded, our chap is really being addressed by Satan. . . . To
make this the kind of case we want we must suppose that this impostor represents
himself as the true God, creator of heaven and earth, righteous judge, merciful redeemer, and so on. Thus most of the operative descriptions . . . are uniquely true of
God, while the direct referential contact is with, say, Satan. . . . If it should turn out
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The Worship-Worthiness View
Having considered the Descriptive Denotation view, we can see that the
Worship-Worthiness view is a principled iteration of it, rather than a rival
on the same level as the Causal Reference view. The Worship-Worthiness
that it was actually Satan, rather than the creator of the heavens and earth, with
whom they were in effective contact, would we not have to admit that our religion, including the referential practices involved, is built on sand, or worse (muck,
slime), and that we are a Satan-worshipping community, for all our bandying
about of descriptions that fit the only true God? (Alston, “Referring to God,” 121)
Alston finds a positive answer intuitive. Subsequent readers of the case demur. Gale finds
that “a wide variety of religious believers . . . all answer Alston’s rhetorical question in the
negative” (Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, 301). He is thus persuaded that some form
of DD is true and chooses for his uniquely satisfiable description “being a supremely great
being . . . and being eminently worthy of worship and obedience” (Gale, On the Nature and
Existence of God, 8). Jerome Gellman, considering a briefer analogue of the Satan Case (“The
Name of God,” 541), suggests that communities whose conception of the baptizand is too
radically different from its actual nature simply fail to refer—his response implies a disjunctive account whereby even a perfectly intact deference chain is an insufficient condition for
successful reference, so worsening accessibility. Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg
take the Satan Case to constitute a counterexample to CR. But rather than adopt DD, they
attempt to amend CR in two ways. Their second amendment supposes that reference change
occurs for the user of a term if the sense they attach to that term is sufficiently false of the
original referent but sufficiently true of another referent (de Ridder and van Woudenberg,
“Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same God,” 58). Plausibly, we can identify
that kind of reference change with the causal circumstance of a teacher failing to pass on a
term correctly. Applied to CR, it will lead back to the semantic vulnerability of “God” so that
CR will continue to risk low accessibility.
Their first amendment is that “when someone who baptizes X is mistaken about X in
fundamental ways, i.e., about the very kind of thing X is, it is implausible that by baptizing
X she has introduced a referring expression for X into the language” (de Ridder and van
Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the Same God,” 58). This amendment immediately invites the question of which mistakes are sufficiently fundamental. De
Ridder and van Woudenberg’s suggested standard is “the distinctions between personal
and non-personal beings, between concrete and abstract entities, between universals and
particulars, between substances, properties, stuffs, events, processes, and modifications, and
between creator and created” (de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in,
and Worshipping the Same God,” 64). When this amendment is applied to ascertain whether
theistic reference is successful in real-world contexts, it runs into trouble, since
Of particular urgency in relation to the question of coreference among the Abrahamic faiths is the question whether the belief that God is not a Trinity should
count as a fundamental mistake that invalidates reference. We confess to having
torn intuitions here. On the one hand, whether or not God is a Trinity strikes us as
a matter of fundamental ontological category; on the other, it doesn’t appear to be
quite as fundamental as the distinction between, say, personal and non-personal
or between creator and created. Clearly, an answer to the question whether Jews,
Christians, and Muslims refer to the same God depends on where you come down
on this issue. (de Ridder and van Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and
Worshipping the Same God,” 64)
Defenders of the Causal Reference view thus can respond to the Satan Case in two ways.
If they treat it as an instance of a semantic shift, the semantic vulnerability of “God” is highlighted and the semantic problem of divine hiddenness demands a theodicy. If they adopt de
Ridder’s and van Woudenberg’s alternative strategy, they must either appeal to their confessional commitments to distinguish more or less “fundamental” properties of God; or, they
must appeal to some other standard. The first option is going to narrow scope again. The
second option demands the question of what that standard might be. My articulation of the
Worship-Worthiness view aims to answer that question in a way which aims to widen scope
and increase accessibility.
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view tells us that “God” stands in for the definite description “the being
which is worthy of our worship.”
Of course, there are alternative iterations of Descriptive Denotation
available. The correct iteration could perhaps be “the being which is responsible for the existence of everything else”; or it could be “the being
which is capable of saving us”; or “the being which is maximally excellent.” To improve the scope, we could substitute vaguer alternatives for
these: “the being which is metaphysically ultimate,” “the being which is
capable of satisfying our ultimate concern,” and “the being which is ultimately valuable,” respectively. It could be a conjunction of these definite
descriptions.43 A really thorough defense of the Worship-Worthiness view
would explain, for each of these possibilities, why it fails to satisfy accessibility and scope to the same degree as WW—in as much detail as was
devoted to showing problems with CR and DD more broadly.
Instead, however, I suggest that there is a generic issue with these alternatives, which WW turns out to be free from. The first is that the name the
definite description “God” stands in for must be possibly satisfied by only
one being, otherwise the reference of “God” in the mouths of different
speakers will split too easily. There could in principle be multiple creators
or multiple saviours. Independently of the considerations I raise below,
which emerge out of thinking about the nature of worship, there could
perhaps even be multiple beings who are maximally excellent.
Now, as they are written above, any of these alternatives could include
a stipulative component to ensure that they are definite descriptions
which rigidly designate—a “uniquely” element as in “the being which
is uniquely responsible for the existence of everything else,” “uniquely
capable of saving us,” and so on. But insofar as they carry such stipulative components these alternatives will be less accessible. “God”-users
can competently refer even with very limited and inchoate conceptual
resources. The burden of proof will fall on the advocate of any iteration of
DD which includes a stipulative component, to show that all these “God”users have implicit access to the “artificial” concept resulting from the
stipulation. Below I will argue that the concept and norms of worship,
however, are learnt through ordinary social interaction from a young age:
the kinds of cosmological, ontological, and axiological concepts involved
in these alternative iterations of DD do not have this advantage.
So, to avoid simply stipulating that God is “the being which is uniquely
worthy of our worship,” and so make sure pretty much all “God”-users
have easy access to the concept which picks out God, we need an argument that our intuitive understanding of worship suggests only one being
can be worthy of worship. The argument I offer below follows recent analyses of worship which suggest that worship, considered as an attitude, is
43
Schellenberg’s “ultimism” is the view that the object of religious engagement is best
understood, for reasons of epistemic humility, as whatever meets (if anything does) such a
conjunct definite description. For a brief prospectus of Schellenberg’s ultimism see his “God
For All Time.”

THE REFERENCE OF “GOD” REVISITED

359

a special case of praise and that desert of both worship and praise tracks
the excellence of the object of worship. For the sake of concision, I accept
both of these claims in what follows—but it is worth pointing out that if
anything is objectively worthy of worship, there is at least one property
which worthiness of worship tracks. So, an alternative argument to the
one below should remain viable on alternative sets of properties and associated attitudes used to analyze worship.
In their discussion of the phenomenology of worship, Tim Bayne and
Yujin Nagasawa present what they call the “uniqueness thesis”: that only
one thing, God, is worthy of worship.44 They suggest that the acceptance
of the uniqueness thesis is what sets monotheism apart from polytheism:
in the terms of this debate, they are claiming that the theistic religious linguistic practice definitely involves it, but polytheistic practices might not.
Plausibly, however, all religious linguistic practices which include the term
“God” ‘with a capital “G,” alongside the term “god” for other entities their
religions involve, set the referent of “God” apart from and above those
gods in some way. The distinction between worship and “mere praise,” or
between worship and “veneration and hero-worship,” or worship and “instances of worship which should be subservient,”45 tracks the distinction
between “God” and the gods. So, there is a narrower and intuitive sense
of “worship,” to which uniqueness seems to apply, at play in all contexts
where religious language involves the term “God” and not merely “god.”
Bayne and Nagasawa take aim at monotheism for being unable to
articulate the difference in kind between the attitude owed only to God
according to the uniqueness thesis and the attitudes we take to our
creaturely heroes.46 Jeremy Gwiazda’s response is to identify “worship”
with the degree of praise owed to the most praiseworthy and to identify
praiseworthiness with excellence.47 At this level of simplicity, Gwiazda’s
account seems to fit well with the data of monotheistic and henotheistic
religions—that is, all the religions which use the theistic religious practice.
On it, any maximally excellent being will be worthy of worship. In order to
secure uniqueness, however, Gwiazda gives a strong account of maximal
excellence according to which only the best possible being can count, and
uniquely so, since that maximal excellence entails His transcendence.48
That Gwiazda appeals to controversial claims about the structure of
value, in order to guarantee that only one being is worthy of worship, does
not mean that these claims must be true in order for the uniqueness thesis
to be true about the nature of worship; nor does it mean that these claims
must be true, or be believed or understood by “God”-users, in order for
those speakers to successfully refer to God by implicitly understanding
44

Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 301.
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Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.
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Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.
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See Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations.”
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Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations,” 523.
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“God” to mean “the being which is worthy of worship.” Just as long as
uniqueness is in fact true of the nature of worship, and God is in fact (for
whatever reason) solely worthy of worship, then He will be the only thing
picked out by “God.” The uniqueness thesis and the notion of worship
which involves it is phenomenologically independent from the axiological
claims Gwiazda uses to defend its coherence.
I suggest we follow Bayne and Nagasawa in taking the uniqueness
thesis as data from the phenomenology of religion. And according to it,
if it turns out that if anyone is worthy of worship, then the set of actually
existing maximally excellent beings is a singleton. If there are multiple
beings who are equally best, then no-one is referred to by “God.” If no-one
is actually the uniquely best then no-one is worthy of our worship, and
“God” does not refer, except in the fictional or conditional sense discussed
in the introduction. For now, let’s take the uniqueness thesis to be true so
that we can easily see how well WW fares against our desiderata. Later, I
will return to defend it more thoroughly.
One more assumption must be taken as data from the phenomenology
of worship: that although being the best is necessary for being worthy of
worship, it is not sufficient. One must also surpass an absolute threshold
of excellence. Otherwise, WW is subject to a range of counterexamples in
which “God” refers to pitiful or evil beings just in virtue of their being
the least pitiful or evil who actually exist. As with the relative excellence
condition defended above, this condition on worthiness of worship can
be defended with more substantive accounts of worship or excellence,
but WW need only commit to the condition, not to any particular reasons
for imposing it. I take the obvious absurdity involved in worshipping the
least-evil (or least-pitiful) being available to show that this latter condition
needs less defense than the uniqueness thesis.
The practices of praise-giving, or whatever other attitudes worship
might be a limit case of, such as awe or gratitude, are socially endemic and
learnt young. Analogues of worship can be present and proper in local,
restricted domains even if only God deserves worship “proper” in a global
or unrestricted domain. It makes sense to speak of my worshipping my
older brother qua the most excellent older boy at school, and we can at least
make sense of our daughters’ worship of Justin Bieber qua most talented
of pop-stars. Indeed, our disagreement with their judgment will initially
have to do with Bieber’s talents as a pop-star, not with Bieber’s inferiority
to Yahweh. If this is true, then there is evidence that we are fast learners
not only when it comes to praise, awe, and gratitude but, also, about the
distinction between their common, and their limit, cases of desert.
These examples allow us to flesh out the uniqueness thesis a little more:49
it tells us that worship belongs only to the best within a given domain
49
This is a somewhat formal way of expressing Bayne and Nagasawa’s observance that
in some contexts the word “worship” is used in ways that imply multiple objects can be
worthy of worship. They give two examples: the veneration of saints and fraternal adoration
of a younger for an older brother, as I have used. In discussing the role uniqueness plays in
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of comparison. But we can of course conceive of a global domain, of all
candidates that could possibly be measured for excellence. Then it can
come out true, all together, that Bieber is in a local sense “worthy” of the
“worship” children offer to pop-stars, while older siblings are “worthy” of
the “worship” they offer to older children, while nevertheless only God is
worthy of worship simpliciter, and it would be improper to worship Bieber
or one’s older sibling in that global domain.
I suggest that “the being which is worthy of our worship” in the global,
absolute sense of “worship,” is implicitly understood to define “God” by
the term’s speakers, even if they would not respond to a question about
what “God” means by giving WW’s definition.
In this way, the Worship-Worthiness view renders God extremely semantically accessible in terms of both conceptual demands and semantic
vulnerability. Because the concept of worship comes so easily to us through
induction into analogous social practices, hardly any “God”-users will
fail to meet the conceptual demands required to successfully denote God
with the term. Because the speaker only needs to use the term with an
implicit associated sense, no history of causal connections to baptizers is
required. So WW thereby renders God highly semantically accessible by
rendering “God” semantically invulnerable, relative to its vulnerability on
the Causal Reference view.
The Worship-Worthiness view also does well in determining wide
co-reference because it implies that co-reference will cut across religions’
different histories, no matter how complex, diverse, or divergent they
are. It will also cut across religions’ differing metaphysical conceptions of
God—perhaps not as unilaterally as their histories, but significantly more
so than on CR or DD. It might be thought that the Worship-Worthiness
view determines that God must be personal and so splits reference between those who accept God’s having a mental life and those who reject
it or believe claims about God which might be taken to exclude it. On the
other hand, religions which use the theistic linguistic practice, but involve
theological claims in tension with God’s personhood, nevertheless involve personal language or imagery whenever worship is actually taking
place: when worshipping ipsum esse subsistens, Christians address God as
“Father” and “Jesus”; when engaging in worship of Brahman, Hindus
venerate images. Perhaps this indicates that non-personal objects can be
worthy of worship, or perhaps it indicates that anti-personal claims about
God’s nature need to be interpreted rather cautiously.
Defending the Uniqueness Thesis
I have argued that the signal advantage of the Worship-Worthiness view
over other iterations of Descriptive Denotation is that it can guarantee
theists’ norms of worship, they argue that the theistic linguistic practice privileges worship
in the global sense above these other analogical or local instances (Bayne and Nagasawa,
“The Grounds of Worship,” 302).
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wide co-reference without requiring “God”-users to bear in mind a concept which requires an additional stipulation to prevent reference from
splitting. This advantage depends on the uniqueness thesis’s being true,
and true of a concept of worship to which the typical “God”-user gets
“easy” access through their social induction into widespread habits and
norms.
But is the uniqueness thesis true? For Gwiazda, the uniqueness thesis
comes out true of all worship only thanks to controversial claims about
the structure of value: only the greatest possible being is worthy of the
most praise, and only one being can be the greatest possible. Bayne and
Nagasawa initially present the uniqueness thesis as a thesis about the
norms of worship which theists do or perhaps should endorse,50 while
elsewhere appealing to it to discredit praise-based accounts of worship as
though it were intrinsic to worship rather than a theistic postulate.51 So it
is ambiguous whether they endorse it. Swinburne’s concise presentation
of a praise- and gratitude-based justification for worship, however, gives
us one example where it is implicitly rejected: “The first religious reason
for following a religious way is to render proper worship and obedience
to whatever God or gods there are” (my italics).52 Following Swinburne, I
have argued elsewhere that the uniqueness thesis is not a norm of worship
as such, but a norm of worship only given theism.53 So the uniqueness
thesis is at least controversial.
Consider the following case:
The Brothers Case:
A wanderer in the desert enjoys a religious experience which impresses
upon him that its object, which he dubs Jim, is incomparably more excellent than anything else the wanderer has ever come across. It seems
to the wanderer that the being must be utterly unique in its excellence.
Before the object of his experience tells him the following, he is struck
by an attitude of utmost praise.

50

Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 302.

Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 308. Their argument is that if worship is a special case of some other attitude, and God were worthy of our worship because
He is worthy of that other attitude, but creatures are also sometimes worthy of that attitude,
then those creatures would also be worthy of worship. But since uniqueness is true, those
creatures cannot be worthy of our worship; so neither can God. Bayne and Nagasawa suppose that it would be unacceptable to theists to respond by recognizing an analogical usage
of the term “worship,” properly used of creatures when they are worthy of great degrees of
praise, gratitude, awe, or whatever else (Bayne and Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,”
302). The response offered by Gwiazda, which I have followed here, is that the limit case of
maximal excellence can occupy the right side of a threshold that triggers an obligation to
respond with worship, whereas mere praise or veneration are the proper response to beings
on the other side (Gwiazda, “Worship and Threshold Obligations,” 522).
51

52

Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 168.
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Burling, “Do We Owe God Worship?” 3–4.
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Then, the object of his experience speaks, and informs the wanderer
that it is one of a pair of such beings. The wanderer mentally dubs the
other Tim.54
If worship is the attitude we should take to the most excellent, then it
seems that, at least subjectively speaking, the wanderer ought to worship
Jim before Jim informs him about Tim. But uniqueness seems to imply
that, after Jim informs the wanderer about Tim, the wanderer should worship neither of them.
On the one hand, this implication seems no more intuitive than responses inconsistent with uniqueness. Perhaps, after Jim speaks, we are
obliged to split our praise-giving activities and attitudes equally between
the two; or perhaps we are obliged to worship just one, but entitled to
choose between them. On the other hand, perhaps we can distinguish between a conception of worship on which uniqueness is true, and one on
which it is not. According to the former the wanderer loses his subjective
obligation to worship Jim the moment he learns about Tim, but according
to the latter it is still obligatory or appropriate for him to worship both—or
perhaps even whichever he chooses.55 What the Worship-Worthiness view
needs is for the former conception to reflect a moral practice to which we
have easy access through socialization into praise-giving practices. Then
WW can be built on that practice, even if there is another nearby alternative we might also call “worship,” which does not include uniqueness.
Perhaps another angle from which we might see the role uniqueness
plays in worship is that of the wrongness of idolatry, understood as worshipping the wrong object, rather than worshipping a physical rather than
personal object. Perhaps idolatry is wrong because it betrays a serious, exclusive commitment that a worshipper has made to her object of worship.
Although this interpretation receives support from within the Jewish and
Christian traditions, whose scriptures maintain a strong thematic connection between idolatry and adultery, this support is not conclusive for us:
our target is a notion of worship not restricted to any tradition.
It may be instead that the wrongness of idolatry is explained in terms of
the uniqueness thesis, and the connection between idolatry and infidelity
54
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for contributing this counterexample to the
uniqueness thesis. Bayne and Nagasawa consider a more abstract version of it (Bayne and
Nagasawa, “The Grounds of Worship,” 308) to attack praise-based accounts for violating the
uniqueness thesis by taking the example to obviously imply that we would be obliged to
worship both beings and they to worship each other.
55
An anonymous reviewer points out that the issue represented by the Brothers Case may
also be presented by the doctrine of the Trinity. The uniqueness thesis renders Christianity
polytheistic, if polytheists are those who (idolatrously, according to the thesis) worship multiple beings. It is possible to interpret passages such as Philippians 2:11 and Revelation 4 and
5 as implying that the Father and Son are two distinct objects of worship; presumably, it is
also possible to independently articulate trinitarianism so as to produce the same result. The
trinitarian defender of the uniqueness thesis should insist that even if these interpretations
and articulations do indeed result in polytheism, all this shows is that we must affirm the
Father’s and Son’s consubstantiality in order to render them the same object of worship.
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to an exclusive, explicit commitment is merely a natural one to make, rather
than idolatry being a special instance of infidelity. The most straightforward
way to show that the wrongness of idolatry is grounded in uniqueness,
rather than fidelity to an exclusive commitment, is to give a case where it
seems right to break off a commitment to worshipping one person, in order
to worship another, in spite of such a commitment being in place.
The Trade-Up Case:
Tamm is a prophet of Baal, a very impressive being. Tamm leads his
household and groups of his countrymen in worshipping Baal, who
is the most excellent being of which Tamm is aware. Baal is not only a
very powerful lightning-manipulator, but is involved in carefully sustaining the human race by supervising his family in managing weather
and fertility.
One day, however, Tamm is summoned along with his colleagues to
watch Elijah, a prophet of a rival deity, Yahweh, carry out a demonstration to show that Yahweh is more powerful than Baal. The supernatural
events at the demonstration give Tamm sufficient evidence to believe
that Yahweh is more powerful than Baal; but they also persuade Tamm
to take Elijah’s theological claims seriously. Elijah explains that Baal
does not enjoy sole providential control over nature, but that Yahweh,
whom Tamm had previously believed to have handed over authority to
Baal millennia ago, is not only the creator but also continues to exercise
providential care over humans and animals.
Before the demonstration, Baal is worthy of Tamm’s worship, at least
subjectively speaking, given Tamm’s information. If we don’t think Baal’s
attributes as described above put him above the absolute threshold of excellence required for worthiness of worship, we can stipulate additional
details in the first part of the Trade-Up Case to satisfy that condition.
It seems that after the demonstration Tamm would be praise-worthy,
rather than blame-worthy, for transferring his worship over to Yahweh
given his new epistemic situation—in spite of breaking his standing commitment to worship Baal. At any rate, we are unlikely to accuse Tamm of
committing idolatry by changing his loyalties. Rather, we might accuse
him of idolatry for continuing to worship Baal instead of or alongside
Yahweh, given what he now knows.
So far, however, our response to Trade-Up only shows that the wrong
of idolatry is not reducible to the wrong of infidelity. To support the view
that the wrongness of idolatry implies the uniqueness thesis we need a
case where we judge someone as guilty of idolatry for changing or dividing their loyalties between equally-good deities, pace Swinburne’s view
that worship could be owed to multiple deities at once.
The Trade-In Case:
Tamm is a prophet of Baal, a very impressive being. Tamm leads his
household and groups of his countrymen in worshipping Baal, who
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is the most excellent being of which Tamm is aware. Baal is not only
a very powerful lightning-manipulator, but is involved in carefully
sustaining the human race by supervising his relations in managing
weather and fertility.
One day, however, a priest arrives in Tamm’s land from the distant
northwest. This priest worships Zeus and performs impressive ceremonies and recites beautiful poetry so that Tamm can see that the priest
is a reliable source of information about Zeus. Zeus is, by the priest’s
account, an equally powerful lightning-manipulator and also involved
in carefully sustaining the human race by supervising his (albeit less
co-operative) family in managing weather and fertility. All told, Zeus is
just exactly as excellent as Baal.
For Tamm to now worship Zeus instead of Baal seems like a paradigmatic
act of idolatry.56 This would remain the case if he simply incorporated the
worship of Zeus into the religious life of his family and “congregation,”
alongside Baal. Note that we are not considering his syncretizing Baal and
56
These cases are built from an anonymous reviewers’ observations about ambiguities
in the norms of worship described in the Old and New Testaments. They point out that,
in religious-political contexts as they are described in the Old Testament we have nations
worshipping their own deities or pantheons, while aware of each others’ deities and pantheons, and each others’ religious practices. So perhaps our intuitions in response to the
fictional Trade-In run counter to the actual worship-practices of historical polytheistic religions. There are three ways of defending uniqueness from this actuality. Firstly, the Old
Testament record may obscure how each nation really perceived the deities of other nations:
they may have regarded them as inferior, and hence were in a situation more like Tamm’s
before encountering Elijah or the priest of Zeus. They may have thought there would be
some value in changing who foreigners worshipped, but not prioritised doing so; the Old
Testament implies they made some effort since Israelite kings apparently found their proselytising convincing. Secondly, these uniqueness-violating practices may have been wrong,
and our intuitions in response to the Trade-Up and Trade-In case reveal this. Then Jews and
Christians can interpret Yahweh’s interactions with Israel and her rivals and conquerors as
helping correct humanity’s worship practices in a time and place where, for whatever social
or political reason, they had become deficient. Thirdly, we can judge these uniqueness-free
worship-practices of pagan polytheists as described in the Old Testament as in some sense
a “legitimate” moral practice which is nearby to the one WW calls “worship,” and can sit
alongside it; then WW will survive as long as WW’s “worship” is commonplace enough in
social practices.
A corollary of this reviewer’s interpretation of Ancient Near-Eastern polytheism (or at
least the plausible construction narrated in parts of the Old Testament) is that, to the extent
that the Old Testament presents Yahweh as another deity who is distinguished from rivals
only by his covenant with Israel and his having created the world, Old Testament theology
will not really be theistic according to WW; and the religious linguistic practice of the Israelites as presented there will not be an appropriate one to analyse to give an account of the
reference of “God.”
This might imply that these polytheistic Israelites failed to refer to God: they refer only to
the fictional character, or tribal deity, Yahweh. By lacking the correct concept of worship, they
do not have the conceptual apparatus to succeed in referring to God by terms such as “El”
or “Adonai” according to WW. But, of course, if Yahweh is interacting with them, they can
refer to Him in the standard causal way using any terms which function as proper names,
rather than using them in the titular way WW supposes “God” works. If Yahweh is God,
then they can refer to God using these proper names. (If Yahweh is not God, they cannot.) As
their theology drifts towards being more properly heno- or mono-theistic through obedience
to the Law, they will enter into the theistic religious linguistic practice, acquire the necessary
conceptual apparatus, and then use these proper names as Hebrew for “God.”
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Zeus, in which case he would continue to worship only one being and
continue to worship Baal. If Tamm would be guilty of idolatry for worshipping Zeus, even though Zeus is just as good as Baal, and if “worthy
of” is the mirror of “owed to,” then Tamm’s owing worship to exactly
one deity establishes that exactly one person can be worthy of worship in
a given domain of excellence. The alternative explanation is that Tamm
would be guilty merely of a kind of infidelity to Baal, but Trade-Up excludes such an interpretation. Furthermore, I suggest that once Tamm
knows about Zeus, he would be unable to approach Baal and lead acts of
worship toward him in the same good faith as before since he will now see
Baal as fungible. In a third case where Tamm accesses all the information
he has across both Trade-Up and Trade-In, we would conclude that he
should give up worshipping Baal or Zeus for Yahweh.
Trade-Up and Trade-In together show us that the norms of worship are
stranger than we might initially have noticed. The remaining danger for
the Worship-Worthiness view is that if we secure the uniqueness thesis
only by drawing attention to the strangeness of worship norms, we have
cut it off from the easily-accessed, routinely socially learnt, moral habits
which made the referent of “God” so accessible. When explaining the connection between “religious” worship and its “everyday” analogues above,
I gave the example of worshipping a sibling qua best older boy in one’s
school, and worshipping a pop star qua best among the pop-stars. One
way of showing that the conception of worship which includes uniqueness is easily learnt would be to re-run analogues of Brothers, Trade-Up,
and Trade-In involving school heroes and pop-stars. A difficulty with this
strategy might be that readers not inclined to hero-worship or fandom
might apply a nearby concept of praise-giving which often answers to
“worship” in English, but is distinct from the “worship” used by the Worship-Worthiness view. The same will arise for other human analogues to
these cases.57 Hopefully, however, these readers will recognize the plausibility of interpreting creaturely re-runs of these cases in a way favourable
to uniqueness. If so, they must acknowledge that many others are in
possession of the conceptual and practical framework which involves
uniqueness and is required by WW.
An additional strategy is to cast our net wider than praise-giving to
other ordinary attitudes, governed by readily learnt moral norms, which
involve something like uniqueness, and see whether they could “teach” the
“God”-user the normative practice and concept they need for successful
reference. Here is one suggestion: Scruton argues that the wrongness of
57
For clarity’s sake, here is such an example: perhaps my younger daughter tells me she
“worships Justin Bieber,” and I can tell from talking to her about what she means, that this
kind of praise disdains all others—she won’t even take Harry Styles’s name upon her lips.
But my elder daughter insists she worships Harry Styles and Zayn Malik equally. The Worship-Worthiness view does not need to insist that my eldest daughter is mistaken; it only
needs us to be able to recognize that her attitude and practice is different from her sister’s
and that her sister’s attitude and practise is a common one.
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idolatry is explained by its being “the peculiarity of sacred things, that
they do not admit of substitutes. . . . The object of worship is to be placed
apart, in the world but not of it, to be addressed as the unique thing that
it is.” He claims that this un-substitutability is “what we mean by calling
it sacred.”58 Importantly, the notion of sanctity at play here is one that,
Scruton points out, extends over different domains outside of worship. He
uses it to explain our treatment of corpses, which represent the deceased
individuals who are non-fungible to the bereaved,59 and also the way in
which pornography profanes the human by making what we should see
as a non-fungible person, fungible with any other body.60
Scruton argues that the interest in something just as that individual, and
not as a member of its kind or as something to use to bring about a state of
affairs, is a completely routine phenomenon in our intentional lives: it is
the intentional attitude we take toward any object of aesthetic interest, not
just humans as beloved persons.61 In the aesthetic case this attitude leads
us to want to contemplate or admire the object. I see no reason, however,
why along with our praise-giving practices directed at agents our practices
of contemplation or admiration directed at objects of aesthetic interests
should not also play their role in equipping many of us with the notion
of worship at stake here, one governed by something like the uniqueness thesis. Certainly, this notion of worship is closer at hand to more
“God”-users than the theological concepts required by rival iterations of
Descriptive Denotation and is not vulnerable to the eddies of intellectual
history like the causal chains involved in the Causal Reference view.
Two Kinds of Counterexample
There are two sources of powerful prospective counterexamples to the
Worship-Worthiness view. The first is that the view seems to distribute
modality across claims about God in counter-intuitive ways. For example,
if “the being that is worthy of our worship” is a description for which
“God” implicitly stands in, then it will be analytically false that “God is
not worthy of our worship.” And this might not seem analytically false:
many logically competent people seem to have been brought to believe
it by experiences of suffering for which they took God to be responsible.
Here is how we should handle such cases. In analogous linguistic practices
involving titles, which refer by picking out a singleton set bounded by a
description, like “King,” “Champion,” and so on, the semantic reference
58
Scruton, Beauty, 179–180. It could be objected that the Trade-Up Case implies that objects
of worship can in fact be substituted, since anything else which is the best in the domain will
“do just as well.” The idolatry involved in exchanging Baal for Zeus in Trade-In, however,
shows things are not that simple. When Tamm trades up to Yahweh he is not substituting a
proper object of worship for an equally adequate replacement; rather, he is realising that Baal
is not a proper object of worship.
59

Scruton, Beauty, 177.

60

Scruton, Beauty, 162–166.

61

Scruton, Beauty, 19–20.
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determined by the description can come apart from the speaker’s reference. Such practices can involve local usages with messy relationships to
the global semantics, in which the title comes to be treated as a proper
name in the Kripkean, causal manner.62 So I could come to treat “God”
as if it were a proper name for Yahweh rather than a title I take Yahweh
to bear. Then, when I suffer at Yahweh’s hands, I can coherently (but, if
Yahweh is God, falsely) believe that “God is not worthy of our worship.”
“God” can be unworthy of our worship only in the sense that “the Champion” can be the loser of the tournament.
The second kind of counter-examples I will consider are those where
beliefs about the nature and activities of God differ so widely that we
might think that a “God”-user, upon changing their beliefs, comes to view
their previous beliefs as pertaining to an entity they now regard as fictional.63 They might now think that they had previously failed to refer. But
on WW, they would be mistaken: they were referring to the being worthy
of our worship all along, if It exists. The critic of the Worship-Worthiness
view can argue that WW is mistaken because the beliefs of these characters about their own referential success or failure are better evidence
than the considerations in favour of WW. This objection presumes that
practitioners know their own practices’ rules better than those practices’
commentators.
Such cases would not function against counterexamples to vague
definite descriptions with a unique satisfier in non-theological contexts,
however—in those other contexts, we simply accept that people can
easily be mistaken about whether or not they successfully referred or
what they really referred to. Consider the infamous Jack the Ripper. “Jack
the Ripper,” at least according to Kripke,64 had its reference fixed by a
definite description something like “the being which committed all the
Whitechapel murders.” If the Whitechapel murders were perpetrated by
a team of copycats, “Jack the Ripper” failed to refer to any of them. Suppose in that world our detective discovers the truth: he will realize that he
had been referring to a fictional character all along. But if the Whitechapel
murders were perpetrated by one man, then the detective is referring to
that man. And he will have been referring to that man even if he erroneously comes to believe that the murders were committed by a team of
copycats. This detective is like our Christian who converts to, let’s say,
neo-pagan polytheism. After her conversion, she believes she failed to
refer to God since (she believes) there is no being worthy of her worship.
But if God exists, she successfully referred to God whatever she believes
about God’s fictional status before her apostasy. Because people can so
62
See Donnellan’s case of the usurper whom both loyalists and traitors call “the King”
despite both sides knowing he is a usurper (“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 290–291).
63
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of a previous draft of this article for offering counter-examples of this kind.
64

For Kripke’s analysis of the Jack the Ripper case see Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 79, 94.
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easily be mistaken about the success (or direction) of their reference, the
attitudes of characters in these cases about their own referential success
are not a good reason to reject the Worship-Worthiness view.
Conclusion
The Worship-Worthiness view, which defines “God” as “the being which
is worthy of our worship,” dominates in competition the rivals that we
have considered. Causal theories of reference, applied to God, struggle to
ensure that reference is available to all the users of the term who appear
perfectly capable of using it; when these theories are refined so as to introduce less semantic vulnerability, they struggle to permit co-reference
between people who appear to be referring to the same thing when they
discuss God with each other, or speak to Him alone, or in concert. An unprincipled descriptivist alternative risks restricting successful reference to
a small minority of those who speak of and speak to “God”; and it cannot
explain the way in which co-reference is assumed by parties to theological
controversies who have fundamentally different beliefs about God. The
Worship-Worthiness view, on the other hand, provides for an account of
what unites religions whose practitioners speak of and to what they call
“God” and gives a simple account of how it is they are so routinely successful in doing so. If there are strong moral motivations for worship,65 it
also helps to explain the perennial importance of theology and religious
behaviour.66
Uppingham School
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